About
Who builds INTYGA, and why.
Janbjer Technologies AB builds INTYGA, which holds an irreversible action in an automated system until a named person signs its exact parameters with a passkey or security key. The code about to run the action verifies that signature offline, against keys it already trusts, without calling INTYGA. We are small, based in Falun, Sweden, and we have deliberately built something you can verify without us.
Why this exists
Automation got fast enough to outrun supervision. A pipeline deploys, a script rotates a credential, an agent calls a tool — and each of those runs on a credential that was valid, issued to a system that was authorized, doing something nobody specifically agreed to. The credential answers who may act. It says nothing about who decided this particular thing should happen.
Most of the industry responded by making identity stronger: better tokens, shorter TTLs, tighter scopes. That is worth doing and it does not close the gap. A scoped credential constrains what a system may do. It cannot tell you that a person looked at an irreversible operation, understood its parameters, and agreed to it.
What we decided to build
One narrow thing: a way to hold an irreversible action until a named human signs its exact parameters with a passkey or security key, and a way for the code about to execute that action to check the signature itself — offline, against the signer's public key, with no call back to us. Hardware binding depends on policy.
The narrowness is deliberate. We do not do identity, we do not do access management, and we do not try to decide whether an action is safe. Other people do those well, and a security product that expands until it overlaps everything ends up being trusted for things it was never designed to guarantee.
The part we are least willing to compromise on
INTYGA holds no key that can approve anything. The signature is produced by the approver's authenticator and its private key is never exposed to us. Synced passkeys may be backed up across the user's devices; a policy can instead require a hardware-bound credential. We could not forge an approval if we were compromised, coerced, or dishonest, because the material required to make one has never been in our possession.
The same reasoning shapes the audit trail, whose checkpoints are anchored to independent transparency logs (an anchor we operate does not count), and the open-source verifier you are asked to rely on. The security architecture sets out how approvals are verified, where the trust sits, and what INTYGA does not claim.
Why Europe first
We are a Swedish company, and building here shaped what we built. European buyers arrive with the EU AI Act's human-oversight obligations, NIS2, and an ISMS to satisfy, and they arrive asking a specific question: not whether oversight happened, but whether it can be demonstrated to someone who does not trust either of us. That is an evidence problem, and it is a better design constraint than a compliance checkbox.
Being precise here matters more than being enthusiastic. Article 14 requires effective human oversight and the ability to demonstrate it. It does not mandate cryptography, and no vendor can sell you conformity with a regulation. What a signature bound to an exact action gives you is evidence a reviewer can check without trusting you: that a person approved those specific parameters. That is a real claim, and a smaller one than the industry usually makes.
What we are not
We are not certified against ISO 27001 or attested under SOC 2 today. ISO 27001 is the active track. Anything we publish about compliance is a readiness and control mapping, and we say so on the page rather than in a footnote.
We are also not the right answer for everyone. If you govern a handful of actions a day on a single platform, a well-configured native control — GitHub Environments, an MFA-protected API call — is probably enough, and we would rather tell you that than sell you something you do not need. The case for a dedicated primitive starts where the approval has to span platforms, outlive the tool that issued it, or convince someone who trusts neither party.
The company
Janbjer Technologies AB — Swedish aktiebolag (AB)
Rickards plan 3, 791 47 Falun, Sweden
Org. no. 559602-1757 · VAT no. SE559602175701 · Approved for F-tax
2026
Founder & Lead Architect. Designed and wrote the protocols the product is built on — DIV for binding an approval to an exact action, and DEWP for making the resulting record auditable by someone who does not trust the vendor. Author of the engineering blog and the guides. Reachable at hello@intyga.com · LinkedIn · GitHub.
The name is the Swedish verb intyga — “to certify” — pronounced /²ɪnˌtyːɡa/, roughly IN-tee-ga.
INTYGA is early and small — one person today, which is why we are looking for a co-founder. We would rather say that plainly than imply a team we do not have.