Engineering blog
Long-form technical writing on the architecture behind INTYGA — what parameter binding actually buys you, why an approval flag is not a signature, and where a witness log stops being able to help.
INTYGA does not make agents trustworthy. It makes trusting them unnecessary — when your own service verifies a human's signed approval before it acts, and holds the only credential that can act.
Read the post →Five verifiers in five languages, all passing the same pinned test vectors on every commit. An audit against the published specs still found three defects the vectors could not see — in two cases because the vectors themselves were wrong. What shared vectors actually prove, and what we changed.
Read the post →ChainDrop began in 11 compromised npm packages and propagated into 433 more — 444 in roughly four hours, with valid build provenance on every release. The loop breaks at one step the worm cannot complete autonomously: a fresh human signature bound to the exact release.
Read the post →A log signed by the party being audited is tamper-evident, not non-repudiable. Client-side signatures plus externally anchored Merkle roots close the gap.
Read the post →Prompt-level safeguards are not a security boundary. Infrastructure-level enforcement means the service performing the action structurally cannot execute a dangerous tool call without a human signature over the exact parameters.
Read the post →Static API keys cannot answer which human authorized a specific irreversible run. Hardware-signed, parameter-bound approvals can — and your code can verify them offline before it executes.
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