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Changelog

What shipped, and when.

INTYGA lets pipelines, scripts and AI agents hold an irreversible action until a named person signs its exact parameters, and the code that runs it verifies the receipt itself. Entries are written when something reaches users, not when it merges. Known limits go in the release that introduced them rather than in a support thread six weeks later.

v2.2.0 Signer exclusions: specification edition 1.3.0 (DIV 1.2.0), SDK/verifier 2.2.0 and MCP packages 3.0.0

A rule that forbids the requester from approving its own action now states, inside the signed requirement, which identities may not count toward quorum: the people who control the requesting agent or service, and the person who issued its current credential. A relying party's verifier enforces the same exclusion offline, including against a key those people hold under another identity.

Before you upgrade

  • Verifiers: upgrade to 2.2.0 before relying on receipts that carry the signer-exclusion fields. A 2.1.0 verifier cannot verify them.
  • @intyga/mcp-sdk 3.0.0: supply the relying party's own tenant, requester, approver trust and requirement floor for every execution. Automatic, unsigned approvals are refused.
  • @intyga/mcp-proxy 3.0.0: configure exactly one validated trust module (--execution-trust-module for service and human calls).

Specification edition 1.3.0 (26 October)

DIV 1.2.0 adds two optional signed fields: requester.credentialIssuerDid and requirement.excludedSignerDids. Each is serialized only when present, so every existing receipt canonicalizes and verifies exactly as before. DEWP 1.1.1 makes a verifier that requires confirmed execution refuse a covered entry redacted to a commitment, since confirmation cannot rest on content it cannot see. Published at /specs/v1.3.0 with schemas, conformance vectors and SHA-256 checksums, and tagged v1.3.0 on GitHub.

SDK and verifier 2.2.0

  • All five verifiers โ€” TypeScript, Python, Go, Rust and Java โ€” check both fields, refuse a signer whose key belongs to an excluded identity, and refuse a field that is present but null or malformed instead of treating it as absent. Upgrade before relying on receipts that carry them: a 2.1.0 verifier cannot verify those receipts.
  • verifyWebAuthnWitness checks a single WebAuthn assertion on its own, with counterparts in every language pinned by shared vectors.
  • Every port refuses an omitted or empty expected nonce, and reports refusals with the same text and in the same order as the TypeScript reference, pinned by the shared parity vectors.
  • Requiring confirmed execution now fails closed when a covered evidence entry has been redacted to a commitment.

MCP SDK and proxy 3.0.0 โ€” breaking

  • @intyga/mcp-sdk requires the relying party's own tenant, requester, approver trust and requirement floor for every execution, verifies the receipt before consuming it and refuses automatic, unsigned approvals.
  • @intyga/mcp-proxy requires exactly one validated trust module (--execution-trust-module for service and human calls) and verifies receipts before forwarding a call.
  • Both cancel in-flight and queued approvals on shutdown before redemption, so a stopping process cannot consume or execute an approval it was still waiting on.

v2.1.0 Execution evidence: specification edition 1.2.0 (DEWP 1.1.0) and SDK/verifier 2.1.0

An approval proves a human signed exact bytes. It never said whether the action then took effect. DEWP 1.1 records that question and its answer in the same tamper-evident log: the executing service reports that it dispatched the approved action, independent evidence sources sign what they observed, and every verifier derives an execution status under trust the relying party chooses.

Specification edition 1.2.0 (19 October)

DEWP 1.1.0 adds ยง4.7: Dispatch, Evidence and Unconfirmed Records, the signed dewp-execution-evidence statement, and the status fold โ€” contradicted over confirmed, unconfirmed once the window closes, not_reported for an approval nobody dispatched. No canonical bytes, hashing, profile layout or bundle version change, so a 1.0 verifier still verifies the commitment and content of every new record. DIV 1.1.1 is informative only: ordinary approval verifiers refuse the statement type, and the reserved pre-execution evidence field is distinguished from post-execution evidence. Published at /specs/v1.2.0 with schemas, conformance vectors and SHA-256 checksums, and tagged v1.2.0 on GitHub.

Hosted gateway and console

  • Register evidence sources โ€” a protection relay, a meter, a measured-boot attester โ€” on the console's Evidence Sources page under passkey step-up. The gateway accepts statements only from a registered, unrevoked source and never authors one: it cannot mint confirmed.
  • After consuming an approval, report the dispatch with an evidence window of up to 24 hours, then relay each source's signed statement. Both are witnessed with the statement in the record, verifiable offline without any INTYGA secret.
  • contradicted is sticky and outweighs any confirmation. A window that closes without qualifying evidence is witnessed as unconfirmed. Webhooks carry confirmed, contradicted, unconfirmed, a late contradiction and a contradiction under a revoked key, so escalation and investigation can be routed differently.
  • Execution evidence is not a Protected Op and is never charged. Nothing in it can refuse, delay or roll back an approval.

SDK and verifier 2.1.0

  • reportDispatched and submitEvidence on the client, buildExecutionEvidence and signExecutionEvidence for the source's side, and an execution block on a consumed approval's status โ€” in TypeScript, Python, Go, Rust and Java.
  • All five verifiers report an execution status for every approval in an evidence bundle under caller-supplied evidence-source trust, kept separate from approver trust, with the window bound and clock allowance as the verifier's own settings. They also report what the gateway cannot see: dispatch records that disagree, gaps and divergences in a source's counter, a late or untrusted contradiction, and an approval no one reported dispatching.
  • An evidence-sources trust file (intyga-evidence-sources) loads into every verifier; a key may carry a validity interval checked at the record's externally witnessed time, never at the statement's own timestamps.

v2.0.0 Tenant-bound receipts: specification edition 1.1.0 and SDK/verifier 2.0.0

Every new approval now signs the workspace whose policy governed it. A receipt can no longer choose the context it is verified in: the relying party supplies the tenant it trusts, independently of the receipt, and a receipt for a different or missing tenant is refused.

Specification edition 1.1.0 (10 October)

DIV 1.1.0 adds signed payload version 2: a required top-level tenantId on ordinary intents, offline intents, delegations, agent authorities and platform intents, with verification against an independently provisioned expected tenant (ยง4.3.7). Version 1 bytes and the frozen 1.0.0 edition are unchanged for historical verification; a version 1 receipt cannot satisfy a tenant-bound expectation. DEWP stays at 1.0.0. Published at /specs/v1.1.0 with schemas, conformance vectors and SHA-256 checksums, and tagged v1.1.0 on GitHub.

SDK and verifier 2.0.0 (11 October)

  • Breaking: tenant-bound verification. Requests and offline approvals carry the tenant established by authenticated credentials or a verified trust bundle; verification requires an independently trusted tenant. Supplying one refuses version 1 receipts; omitting it keeps historical version 1 verification working. Trust bundles require a signed tenantId, and trust-anchor files may pin the expected tenant.
  • Delegation verification binds to the independently expected requester, so one workload cannot reuse another's otherwise valid delegation. All five verifiers accept an expected requesterDid.
  • Quorum counts distinct public-key values as well as distinct identities, across equivalent key encodings, so one key under two names still counts once.
  • Go consumers import github.com/intyga-dev/verify-go/v2 and sdk-go/v2. Explicit client credentials take precedence over a stored CLI login and fail closed when incomplete.
  • Published as a matched set: @intyga/sdk, @intyga/verify, @intyga/mcp-sdk and @intyga/mcp-proxy on npm; intyga-sdk on PyPI; intyga-sdk and intyga-verify on crates.io and Maven Central (com.intyga); v2.0.0 tags for Go; and the require-approval GitHub Action at v2, which pins this set.

v1.2.0 SDK and verifier 1.2.0: offline signing keys in the trust bundle

A matched 1.2.0 release of the SDK and verifier in TypeScript, Python, Go, Rust and Java. No signed bytes change; a 1.0.0 receipt verifies unchanged.

  • Trust bundles list an approver's offline signing keys separately (DIV ยง5a.4). They are admitted only for offline intents, never to seal a delegation, and a key appearing in both lists is refused.
  • Trust-anchor files carry a purpose. A file exported for online verification is refused by the offline path and vice versa; an offline anchor must pin a key for every approver.
  • requireApproval falls back to an offline ceremony only when the gateway could not be reached or answered 5xx. A local error โ€” a blank target, missing credentials โ€” is thrown instead of starting a ceremony that binds the faulty input.
  • Offline reconciliation reports a corrupt pending record by name and continues with the rest, instead of returning nothing.
  • The verifier exports its strict DIV ยง6.2 RFC 3339 parser so the SDK checks bundle timestamps under the same grammar.

v1.0.0 First public release

INTYGA is available. Pipelines, scripts, and AI agents can hold an irreversible action until a named human signs its exact parameters with a passkey or security key, and the executing code can verify that receipt itself.

Approvals

  • requireApproval blocks until a human signs or the deadline passes, with a matching server-side TTL so a challenge cannot outlive the wait.
  • Signatures are WebAuthn assertions made inside the approver's own authenticator. INTYGA holds no key capable of producing a valid approval.
  • M-of-N quorums, approver groups, and escalation routes are defined in gateway-owned rules โ€” a requester cannot lower its own threshold.
  • Approval rules can require a hardware authenticator with trusted manufacturer attestation on every plan, and restrict to specific authenticator models on Business. Ordinary login and approvals also accept synced passkeys.

Verification

  • verifyApprovalReceipt re-derives the canonical payload from the parameters you are about to execute, so an approval for one action cannot authorize another.
  • Apache-2.0 verifiers for TypeScript, Python, Go, Rust, and Java cover approval, offline, delegation, agent-authority and platform receipts. The TypeScript verifier runs on Node.js with no npm runtime dependencies; optional RFC 3161 timestamp verification requires OpenSSL 3.
  • Verification is offline and free forever on every plan, including the free one.

Evidence

  • Approvals are committed to a tamper-evident log. Per-tenant sequence and checkpoint continuity checks detect gaps among committed events within the verified range.
  • DEWP verification checks Merkle inclusion proofs and anchor evidence against caller-selected trust and quorum requirements. Supported evidence includes signed anchors, pinned-key Rekor entries and RFC 3161 timestamps.
  • Retention runs 14 days on Developer through 7 years plus legal hold on Enterprise. Redacted records keep their cryptographic commitment, so historical proofs still verify.

Integration

  • REST authorize endpoint, TypeScript, Python, Go, Rust and Java SDKs, and an MCP adapter for AI agent tool calls.
  • SSO-assisted first-passkey enrollment and SCIM provisioning on Business and above. Console sign-in uses a passkey.
  • Self-hosted VPC deployment on Enterprise.

Embedded platforms (DIV ยง5c)

  • A service with its own end users can embed the primitive white-label: opaque subjects, passkey ceremonies on the platform's own domain, and receipts over a payload digest โ€” the payload itself never reaches INTYGA.
  • Platform API keys authenticate with a signed assertion (private_key_jwt) only; their static secret is refused.
  • A Relying Party can be registered in test mode on loopback addresses such as localhost: real passkey ceremonies and witnessed receipts without billing.
  • Dedicated platform-receipt verification is available in TypeScript, Python, Go, Rust and Java. Ordinary approval verifiers refuse platform receipts.

Open specifications and IETF submissions

The DIV and DEWP specifications are published as version 1.0.0 with JSON Schemas, conformance vectors and SHA-256 checksums. The same release is available on GitHub under Apache-2.0.

Submitted draft-janbjer-div-00 and draft-janbjer-dewp-00 to the IETF as individual Internet-Drafts. Both reference the version 1.0.0 schemas and conformance vectors. Submission does not imply IETF adoption or endorsement.

Signed payloads retain protocol version 1.0. This specification release includes the seven-field DEWP anchor format, binding the sequence range and checkpoint chain hash; anchors over the earlier four-field format do not satisfy its verification requirements.