v1.0 First public release
INTYGA is available. Pipelines, scripts, and AI agents can hold an irreversible action until a named human signs its exact parameters with a passkey or security key, and the executing code can verify that receipt itself.
Approvals
- requireApproval blocks until a human signs or the deadline passes, with a matching server-side TTL so a challenge cannot outlive the wait.
- Signatures are WebAuthn assertions made inside the approver's own authenticator. INTYGA holds no key capable of producing a valid approval.
- M-of-N quorums, approver groups, and escalation routes are defined in gateway-owned rules — a requester cannot lower its own threshold.
- Approval rules can require a hardware-backed authenticator on every plan — enforcing the product's headline promise is not something to paywall — and restrict to specific authenticator models on Business.
Verification
- verifyApprovalReceipt re-derives the canonical payload from the parameters you are about to execute, so an approval for one action cannot authorize another.
- Verifiers for TypeScript, Python, Go, Rust, and Java. The TypeScript verifier is dependency-free and Apache-2.0.
- Verification is offline and free forever on every plan, including the free one.
Evidence
- Every approval is committed to a tamper-evident log with a gapless per-tenant sequence, so a deleted record leaves a detectable hole.
- Daily checkpoint roots are anchored to independent transparency logs, with a quorum of at least two distinct issuers in production.
- Retention runs 14 days on Developer through 7 years plus legal hold on Enterprise. Redacted records keep their cryptographic commitment, so historical proofs still verify.
Integration
- REST authorize endpoint, TypeScript, Python, Go, Rust and Java SDKs, and an MCP adapter for AI agent tool calls.
- SSO and SCIM on Business and above.
- Self-hosted VPC deployment on Enterprise.
Embedded platforms (DIV §5c)
- A service with its own end users can embed the primitive white-label: opaque subjects, passkey ceremonies on the platform's own domain, and receipts over a payload digest — the payload itself never reaches INTYGA.
- Platform API keys authenticate with a signed assertion (private_key_jwt) only; their static secret is refused.
- A Relying Party can be registered in test mode: fully real and fully witnessed, never billed — build on localhost before a production domain exists.
- Offline verification of platform receipts ships in the TypeScript verifier; the Go, Rust, Python and Java verifiers refuse the payload type until they implement DIV §5c.