Guides
Proving what a person approved, one question at a time.
Each guide answers a single question in its first paragraph, then shows the evidence, the verification step and what the answer does not cover.
Have the person sign the exact action โ its target and parameters, not a session or a summary โ with a key they control, such as a passkey, and have the service that executes the action verify that signature against what it is about to do. The signed receipt is the proof: anyone holding the approver's public key and the expected action can check it offline, without trusting the agent, your logs or the vendor that relayed it.
Have a party independent of the agent and of the service that sent the command โ a meter, a protection relay, a measured-boot attester โ sign what it observed, bound to the hash of the approved action, and keep that statement in the same tamper-evident record as the approval. Your own logs say what your system believes it did; a third party needs an observation your system could not have written. A confirmed status means a trusted source signed an observation of the approved effect, not that the effect is physically proven; a compromised or misconfigured source can sign a false observation.
Identity verification establishes who a person is, or who is at the keyboard when a session starts. Approval evidence establishes what that person agreed to โ a signature over the exact action and its parameters โ in a form someone else can check later without trusting the system that recorded it. A strong sign-in proves the first and says nothing about the second.