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Proving what a person approved, one question at a time.

Each guide answers a single question in its first paragraph, then shows the evidence, the verification step and what the answer does not cover.

How to prove a human approved an AI agent's action

Have the person sign the exact action โ€” its target and parameters, not a session or a summary โ€” with a key they control, such as a passkey, and have the service that executes the action verify that signature against what it is about to do. The signed receipt is the proof: anyone holding the approver's public key and the expected action can check it offline, without trusting the agent, your logs or the vendor that relayed it.

How to verify an AI agent's action actually succeeded

Have a party independent of the agent and of the service that sent the command โ€” a meter, a protection relay, a measured-boot attester โ€” sign what it observed, bound to the hash of the approved action, and keep that statement in the same tamper-evident record as the approval. Your own logs say what your system believes it did; a third party needs an observation your system could not have written. A confirmed status means a trusted source signed an observation of the approved effect, not that the effect is physically proven; a compromised or misconfigured source can sign a false observation.

Identity verification vs approval evidence: the difference

Identity verification establishes who a person is, or who is at the keyboard when a session starts. Approval evidence establishes what that person agreed to โ€” a signature over the exact action and its parameters โ€” in a form someone else can check later without trusting the system that recorded it. A strong sign-in proves the first and says nothing about the second.