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Open specifications

DEWP — Deterministic Evidence & Witness Protocol

Open specificationDEWP 1.1.1 · Edition 1.3.0 · October 2026

DEWP is an open protocol for tamper-evident audit logs: anyone can check offline that a committed record was not altered afterwards, using inclusion proofs against independently anchored roots. Since version 1.1 it also records what a caller-trusted evidence source reported about whether an approved action took effect.

Abstract

Where DIV authorizes an operation immediately before execution, post-execution governance requires non-repudiable proof that events were committed to a tamper-evident log. DEWP uses inclusion proofs against independently anchored roots to check committed records without relying on vendor-asserted roots alone.

DEWP specifies domain-separated Merkle leaf canonicalization, a two-tier log hierarchy, gapless per-tenant sequence validation, dual-mode verification for redacted entries, signed anchor objects, and portable offline proof bundles. Any relying party or independent auditor can verify authenticity, payload binding, and completeness offline — without vendor secrets or network APIs.

Domain separation

Hashing uses distinct one-byte prefixes so an interior node hash can never be reinterpreted as a valid leaf preimage. This applies the technique of RFC 6962 §2.1, extended with empty-root and anchor tags.

Leaf hash        SHA-256( 0x00 || UTF8(canonical preimage) )
Node hash        SHA-256( 0x01 || left || right )    -- children hex-decoded to raw 32 bytes,
                                                        never concatenated as hex text
Empty tree root  SHA-256( 0x02 )
Anchor preimage  SHA-256( 0x03 || UTF8(JCS(anchor array)) )
Chain hash       SHA-256( 0x04 || UTF8(chain preimage) )   -- checkpoint continuity chain, §5.4

The completeness guarantee, stated honestly

Every committed event carries a strictly monotonic per-tenant sequence counter. Auditors must reject any bundle containing gaps, duplicates, or out-of-order values. A producer cannot silently drop, reorder, or alter an event that was assigned a sequence number and committed under a published anchor without leaving a hole or a broken leaf hash.

Anchor quorum

A daily checkpoint root counts as anchor-verified only when the verifier's quorum policy is satisfied by distinct trusted issuers attesting the same root — a DEWP signature for SELF anchors, or verified external evidence (a pinned-key Rekor Signed Entry Timestamp, an RFC 3161 timestamp token). WEBHOOK anchors do not count in the shipped verifiers. RFC 3161 verification uses optional OpenSSL 3 adapters with caller-selected TSA trust and revocation policy. A single anchor provider is a single point of compromise, so the required count should be two or more for high-assurance non-repudiation.

Where a DEWP signature is present, it is computed over the raw 32-byte anchor digest — not its 64-character hex encoding; a verifier that hex-encodes the digest before checking is non-conformant. Each anchor binds the checkpoint’s sequence range and chain hash. External witness times must satisfy the caller’s time bound, which defaults to 24 hours. Only caller-attributed, trusted anchors for the same checkpoint may establish divergence; if they attest different roots, verification returns INVALID. Divergence is evidence of a problem, and silently resolving it would discard exactly the signal the quorum exists to produce.

Four orthogonal verification properties

A verifier must evaluate four independent booleans and expose all of them, so a relying party can apply its own policy rather than inherit a summary judgment.

PropertyMeaning
commitmentVerifiedThe two-hop Merkle inclusion — leaf to block root to daily root — recomputes to the bundle's checkpoint root. Holds even for redacted entries where only the leaf is retained.
contentVerifiedCommitment verified, the full canonical preimage is present, and its leaf hash matches. Not achievable for commitment-only entries whose content was purged.
signatureVerifiedThe embedded event signature material verifies offline. Requires content verification — you must have the signed bytes.
anchorVerifiedThe checkpoint root satisfies the verifier's anchor quorum policy: enough trusted issuers signed the same root under the anchor domain tag.

These derive a summary level — INVALID, COMMITMENT_VERIFIED, CONTENT_VERIFIED, SIGNATURE_VERIFIED, or FULLY_VERIFIED — but the summary is for display. A relying party must not treat SIGNATURE_VERIFIED as implying independent non-repudiation: without anchor verification, the root is still only vendor-asserted.

For example, a bundle can verify its commitment, content and signature while anchorVerified is false. Its summary is SIGNATURE_VERIFIED: the record and its signature check out, but the checkpoint has not met the verifier's anchor quorum. A relying party that needs independent non-repudiation requires anchorVerified as well.

Privacy and retention

Commitment-only entries let a retention ladder purge sensitive content while leaving the Merkle commitment intact. A record can be redacted to satisfy a deletion obligation and still prove, years later, that something specific was committed at a specific time — which is what makes a retention policy and an audit trail compatible rather than opposed.

Execution evidence (version 1.1)

A DIV approval establishes that a human approved exact bytes. A committed DEWP event establishes that a record was not altered after commitment. Neither says whether the approved action then took effect. Section 4.7 records that question and its answer: a Dispatch Record when the executing party sends the approved action to its target, and Execution Evidence Statements signed by evidence sources the verifier chooses to trust.

From those records a verifier derives an Execution Status for each approval — confirmed, contradicted, unconfirmed, pending or not_reported — under its own evidence-source trust, kept separate from approver trust. Every record is an ordinary leaf, so a verifier that does not implement the section still verifies its commitment and content.

Relationship to DIV

The two specifications are independent but composable. An implementation may embed a verified DIV payload, its intent hash, and its signature metadata into the DEWP canonical preimage — but nothing in the preimage ties those slots to DIV: any pre-execution protocol whose proof is a signature over a canonical byte string can occupy them under the same rules.

One caution the specification states explicitly: the presence of a DEWP witness event must not be interpreted as proof that DIV authorization occurred, unless the associated DIV proof material is independently verified. An entry in a tamper-evident log is evidence that something was recorded, not evidence that it was approved.