DEWP — Deterministic Evidence & Witness Protocol
DEWP is an open protocol for tamper-evident audit logs: anyone can check offline that a committed record was not altered afterwards, using inclusion proofs against independently anchored roots. Since version 1.1 it also records what a caller-trusted evidence source reported about whether an approved action took effect.
This page is an overview. Read the full specification, edition 1.3.0 (Markdown) → · Source and tagged release →
Abstract
Where DIV authorizes an operation immediately before execution, post-execution governance requires non-repudiable proof that events were committed to a tamper-evident log. DEWP uses inclusion proofs against independently anchored roots to check committed records without relying on vendor-asserted roots alone.
DEWP specifies domain-separated Merkle leaf canonicalization, a two-tier log hierarchy, gapless per-tenant sequence validation, dual-mode verification for redacted entries, signed anchor objects, and portable offline proof bundles. Any relying party or independent auditor can verify authenticity, payload binding, and completeness offline — without vendor secrets or network APIs.
Domain separation
Hashing uses distinct one-byte prefixes so an interior node hash can never be reinterpreted as a valid leaf preimage. This applies the technique of RFC 6962 §2.1, extended with empty-root and anchor tags.
Leaf hash SHA-256( 0x00 || UTF8(canonical preimage) )
Node hash SHA-256( 0x01 || left || right ) -- children hex-decoded to raw 32 bytes,
never concatenated as hex text
Empty tree root SHA-256( 0x02 )
Anchor preimage SHA-256( 0x03 || UTF8(JCS(anchor array)) )
Chain hash SHA-256( 0x04 || UTF8(chain preimage) ) -- checkpoint continuity chain, §5.4The completeness guarantee, stated honestly
Every committed event carries a strictly monotonic per-tenant sequence counter. Auditors must reject any bundle containing gaps, duplicates, or out-of-order values. A producer cannot silently drop, reorder, or alter an event that was assigned a sequence number and committed under a published anchor without leaving a hole or a broken leaf hash.
Anchor quorum
A daily checkpoint root counts as anchor-verified only when the verifier's quorum policy is satisfied by distinct trusted issuers attesting the same root — a DEWP signature for SELF anchors, or verified external evidence (a pinned-key Rekor Signed Entry Timestamp, an RFC 3161 timestamp token). WEBHOOK anchors do not count in the shipped verifiers. RFC 3161 verification uses optional OpenSSL 3 adapters with caller-selected TSA trust and revocation policy. A single anchor provider is a single point of compromise, so the required count should be two or more for high-assurance non-repudiation.
Where a DEWP signature is present, it is computed over the raw 32-byte anchor digest — not its 64-character hex encoding; a verifier that hex-encodes the digest before checking is non-conformant. Each anchor binds the checkpoint’s sequence range and chain hash. External witness times must satisfy the caller’s time bound, which defaults to 24 hours. Only caller-attributed, trusted anchors for the same checkpoint may establish divergence; if they attest different roots, verification returns INVALID. Divergence is evidence of a problem, and silently resolving it would discard exactly the signal the quorum exists to produce.
Four orthogonal verification properties
A verifier must evaluate four independent booleans and expose all of them, so a relying party can apply its own policy rather than inherit a summary judgment.
| Property | Meaning |
|---|---|
| commitmentVerified | The two-hop Merkle inclusion — leaf to block root to daily root — recomputes to the bundle's checkpoint root. Holds even for redacted entries where only the leaf is retained. |
| contentVerified | Commitment verified, the full canonical preimage is present, and its leaf hash matches. Not achievable for commitment-only entries whose content was purged. |
| signatureVerified | The embedded event signature material verifies offline. Requires content verification — you must have the signed bytes. |
| anchorVerified | The checkpoint root satisfies the verifier's anchor quorum policy: enough trusted issuers signed the same root under the anchor domain tag. |
These derive a summary level — INVALID, COMMITMENT_VERIFIED, CONTENT_VERIFIED, SIGNATURE_VERIFIED, or FULLY_VERIFIED — but the summary is for display. A relying party must not treat SIGNATURE_VERIFIED as implying independent non-repudiation: without anchor verification, the root is still only vendor-asserted.
For example, a bundle can verify its commitment, content and signature while anchorVerified is false. Its summary is SIGNATURE_VERIFIED: the record and its signature check out, but the checkpoint has not met the verifier's anchor quorum. A relying party that needs independent non-repudiation requires anchorVerified as well.
Privacy and retention
Commitment-only entries let a retention ladder purge sensitive content while leaving the Merkle commitment intact. A record can be redacted to satisfy a deletion obligation and still prove, years later, that something specific was committed at a specific time — which is what makes a retention policy and an audit trail compatible rather than opposed.
Execution evidence (version 1.1)
A DIV approval establishes that a human approved exact bytes. A committed DEWP event establishes that a record was not altered after commitment. Neither says whether the approved action then took effect. Section 4.7 records that question and its answer: a Dispatch Record when the executing party sends the approved action to its target, and Execution Evidence Statements signed by evidence sources the verifier chooses to trust.
From those records a verifier derives an Execution Status for each approval — confirmed, contradicted, unconfirmed, pending or not_reported — under its own evidence-source trust, kept separate from approver trust. Every record is an ordinary leaf, so a verifier that does not implement the section still verifies its commitment and content.
Relationship to DIV
The two specifications are independent but composable. An implementation may embed a verified DIV payload, its intent hash, and its signature metadata into the DEWP canonical preimage — but nothing in the preimage ties those slots to DIV: any pre-execution protocol whose proof is a signature over a canonical byte string can occupy them under the same rules.
One caution the specification states explicitly: the presence of a DEWP witness event must not be interpreted as proof that DIV authorization occurred, unless the associated DIV proof material is independently verified. An entry in a tamper-evident log is evidence that something was recorded, not evidence that it was approved.